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ABSTRACT:  
 
This article takes up the distinction between incremental analysis and incremental politics as 
elaborated by Lindblom in his 1979 article. We argue that while rationalism as a mode of analysis 
has lost much of  its prominence, rationalism as symbolic politics is still very much alive and 
might even be more present today than it was back when Lindblom wrote his famous 1959 
article. The recent shift to new modes of governance whereby elected officials are increasingly 
delegating decision-making powers to independent bureaucracies – what Majone calls the 
“regulatory state” or what the British describe as “agencification” or quangoisation” – has created 
an important legitimacy deficit for those non-majoritarian institutions that exercise political 
authority without enjoying any direct link to the electoral process. In such a context – and in 
addition to growing public distrust towards partisan politics - rationalist politics is likely to 
become more rampant as independent bureaucracies lack the legitimacy to publicly recognize the 
fundamentally incrementalist – and thus values-laden – nature of their decision-making processes. 
To develop these ideas, the article looks at the case of “supreme audit institutions”. We argue that 
rationalist politics is a mean for SAIs to legitimize their shift from classical financial auditing to 
performance auditing. In comparison to other independent bureaucracies, they are particularly 
prone to rationalist politics not just because of their institutional independence, but also because 
of the tradition of financial auditing and the rise of new public management.   
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In 1959, the synoptic model was dominant in decision analysis and represented the main 
adversary against which Lindblom developed his incisive critique of theoretical 
approaches that depicted policy-making as an exercise in means/ends rationality based on 
the analysis of comprehensive information. Since the publication of Lindblom’s seminal 
article, various theoretical developments have successfully contested rationalism’s former 
dominant position1. We think not just of the argumentative turn in policy analysis, but 
also of the renewed interest in bounded rationality within the policy agenda literature or 
the concept of path-dependency in historical institutionalism. Today, what we are left with 
is not so much rationalism as an empirically credible theory or mode of analysis, but 
rationalism as a form of symbolic politics that various bureaucratic entities use to project the 
“illusion” of rational comprehensive decision-making as a strategy to legitimize the exercise 
of political power. This is the key proposition we explore this paper. 
 
In the same way that Lindblom recognized in his “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through” 1979 
article the need to differentiate between incremental analysis and incremental politics, this 
article uses a similar distinction and suggests that although the image of an omniscient 
decision-maker with no cognitive limit able to process all the relevant information has 
probably disappeared from most public policy textbooks, rationalist politics is still very much 
alive and might even be more present today than it was back when Lindblom wrote his 
famous article. By rationalist politics we mean, that public officials, especially those 
working in independent bureaucracies, mobilize the rational mode of analysis in order to 
                                                
1 In documenting the division between the “synoptic and anti-synoptic traditions” in social science, Garson 
writes that, following the publication of Lindblom’s article in 1959, “the anti-synoptic view quickly 
became dominant in political science generally, [but] the synoptic tradition proved far more viable in the 
fields of public administration and public policy” (1981, p. 538). 
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publicly justify and legitimize their action. The recent shift to new modes of governance 
whereby elected officials are increasingly delegating decision-making powers to 
independent bureaucracies – what Majone calls the “regulatory state” or what the British 
describe as “agencification” or “quangoisation” – has created an important legitimacy 
deficit for those non-majoritarian institutions that exercise political authority without 
enjoying any direct link to the electoral process (Majone, 1999). In such a context – and 
in addition to growing public distrust towards partisan politics - rationalist politics is 
likely to become more rampant as independent bureaucracies often lack the legitimacy to 
openly acknowledge the fundamentally incrementalist and thus political nature of their 
decision-making processes.  
 
Our argument is not that rationalist politics is a form of conspiracy whereby unelected 
bureaucrats secretly seek to usurp the power of democratically elected officials. It is also 
different from what Yates calls “silent politics”, which looks at how rational but 
impossible management schemes allow bureaucrats to negotiate and settle value-laden 
issues, without choices being raised to the attention of politicians or the public (Yates, 
1982). Rather, our goal is to highlight the symbolic role of the synoptic-rational model in 
politics today: how it constitutes a tool for (some) independent bureaucracies to 
demonstrate their conformity to rational rules, enhance the credibility of their decisions 
and thus foster the legitimacy of their actions (Boswell, 2009).  
 
Delegating powers to unelected bodies operating independently from government always 
raises issues of legitimacy and accountability (Thatcher, 2002). As often argued in the 
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literature, the legitimacy of independent agencies depends on their expertise and the 
robustness of the technical or scientific rationale underlying their decision processes 
(Schrefler, 2010). By being seen to draw on the rational/synoptic model, an organization 
can enhance its legitimacy and authority (Boswell, 2008). To develop this idea, and to 
provide some suggestive illustrations in its support, the paper draws on the work of 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on institutional isomorphism as a source of legitimacy and 
relies on empirical material derived from comparative studies looking at the evolution of 
“supreme audit institutions” (SAIs). SAIs are arguably among the most independent 
bureaucratic institutions currently existing in modern polities (Pollitt, and Summa, 1999). 
With the “audit explosion” and the rise of the new public management (Power, 2003), the 
role of SAIs has been significantly broadened to encompass wider issues of efficiency, 
effectiveness and value for money (Glynn, 1985). This should make them an ideal site to 
observe how rationalist politics operates, as their independence is based on a form of 
technocratic legitimacy that makes SAIs more likely to project a view of the policy 
process that is closer to the synoptic than to the more political incrementalist model. 
 
The Normative Power of the Synoptic Model  
For all its faults, the synoptic model and the belief that advances in knowledge and 
technology can help solve social problems still remains an ideal in complex modern 
societies (Ferris, 2010). It is something to strive for, as “the rational-comprehensive 
model has at least the advantage of stimulating administrators to get a little outside of 
their regular routine” (Dror, 1964, p.155). The synoptic approach has a powerful 
normative appeal and as much of the research shows, norms take time to change (Gabler, 
 5 
2010). The notion of science as “in service to democracy” is a recurrent theme in the 
policy literature, as in everyday political discourse (DeLeon, 1997). What makes the 
synoptic model a particularly attractive tool for independent bureaucracies lacking 
democratic legitimacy is its appearance of neutrality, being founded as it is on the 
positivistic fact-value dichotomy (Hawkesworth, 1988), itself intimately linked to the 
politics-administration dichotomy in public administration (Rosenbloom, 2008). 
Together, these dichotomies assume a firm distinction between the empirical and 
normative dimensions of policy issues. Normative questions, since they are viewed as 
resting on subjective value judgements, are considered inappropriate for bureaucrats to 
deal with. As a result, their work is usually portrayed as a purely neutral activity, non-
normative and apolitical. This makes it possible to “keep the lid” on what Behn calls “the 
dirty little secret of public administration: civil servants do make policy” (2001, p.64). 
They do make values judgments but “typically, they disclaim that they are doing any 
such thing. They insist that they are merely filling in the administrative details of overall 
policies established by their political superiors” (Behn, 2001, p.64).  
 
Of course, Lindblom discarded the fact-value dichotomy and argued instead that the 
choice of ends and means were closely intertwined in the decision process (1959, pp.81-
83). His seminal 1959 article and frontal attack on rationalism opened the doors for the 
subsequent development of more critical approaches, including post-positivism and the 
argumentative turn in policy analysis (Stone, 2002). Contemporary policy theory 
increasingly assumes a pluralist political framework and what Fischer calls “post-
empiricist” epistemologies (2003). “As rationalist and synoptic models of policy making 
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gave way to models based on incrementalism, negotiation and bargaining” writes Mary 
Henkel, “so the ideal of objective, value-free social science faded” (1991, p.122). More 
and more policy theorists seek to move beyond an ‘objectivist’ conception of reality and 
recognize that ‘facts’ are always theory-laden and thus subject to interpretations and 
contestations. This research suggests that understandings of the social world are framed 
through the discourses of the actors themselves, rather than fixed in nature (Fischer, 
2009). Nowadays, policy analysts are more in the business of providing persuasive 
arguments rather than conclusive judgements (Majone, 1989).  
 
But while incrementalism may well have had a major impact on what policy scholars in 
academia do, its effect on politics and on the “real world” of public policy seems to have 
been more limited. This would not come as a surprise to Lindblom himself, since he 
consistently rejected the idea that knowledge, policy analysis or social science had much 
impact on what governments do (Lindblom, 1992).  
 
Incrementalism and the post-positivist approaches that followed it have real political 
implications, and these implications prevent them from fitting easily into policy-making 
structures. Much of professional policy analysis takes place in government institutions, 
and that analysis, according to Pal, “presents itself as neutral and non-partisan”. As he 
wrote, a “key phenomenon of modern government is the way in which policy discourse is 
conducted as though it were neutral and objective. This reflects a belief in the positivist 
tradition of policy analysis: that pure, objective policy truths do exist” (1992, p.66). 
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Incrementalism is subversive for public administration because it puts into question the 
notion that elected officials are “on top” and bureaucrats and experts “on tap”. It 
challenges traditional conceptions that view accountability as a tidy, linear and 
hierarchical process. People elect their representatives; these individuals then decide 
which values and policy goals to pursue and they subsequently turn to the administrative 
apparatus to find and adopt the most efficient mean to implement policy.  If citizens do 
not like their government’s policies they can vote their elected officials out of office. This 
distinction between politics and administration permits the construction of a simple, 
appealing, hierarchical model of accountability. And despite its flaws, that model has 
one, big advantage: political legitimacy.  
 
So, while incrementalism may make good sense intellectually, it is politically 
problematic for ministers and bureaucrats in government. If ministers publicly 
acknowledge that bureaucrats do make policy decisions, they risk undermining their 
authority and leadership as the hierarchical head of their department. And if bureaucrats 
openly admit that they make political values judgements, they risk eroding the 
permanence of the civil service, which is linked to its apolitical nature. These forces not 
only discourage the use of incremental and post-positivist approaches, but also help to 
explain the persistence of the synoptic model and its positivist methodologies, despite the 
fact that their intellectual foundations were undermined a long time ago. Moreover, “the 
aura of science and objectivity that surrounds positivist policy analysis adds to the image 
of the policy analyst as an apolitical technocrat” (Amy, 1984, p.211). This technocratic 
image is much of what justifies the role of bureaucrats in the policy-making system. It 
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underlies what McSwite calls the “Man of Reason model of the public administrator’s 
role” (1997). Thus, while the notion that decision-making is a purely rational activity is 
clearly a fiction, it is a politically useful fiction to cultivate. 
 
Bureaucratic Independence and Democratic Legitimacy 
Independent bureaucratic institutions always face a problem of legitimacy in democratic 
systems of representative government (Vibert, 2007). But not all such institutions are 
equally independent (Carpenter, 2001). In the most general terms, independence refers to 
a form of separation that ensures other interests or identities will not affect the actions of 
a specific agent (Clarke, 2005, p.5). Bureaucratic independence is not a static variable. It 
is not simply the result of institutional design; that is, an effect whose cause is to be found 
in the decision of rational political principals determining in advance how much 
independence and authority they are willing to confer upon an organization that they are 
in the process of designing. Bureaucratic independence evolves over time and largely 
depends on an organization’s reputation for efficiency and expertise and its ability to be 
seen as providing a unique type of services (Carpenter, 2010).  
 
In the European Union, where much of the recent work on the politics of delegation and 
bureaucratic autonomy has taken place, the focus so far has been on independent 
regulatory agencies (IRAs). These bodies are said to fulfill regulatory goals in the public 
interest (such as rights protection, enforcement of competition rules, or consumer 
protection) better than central government institutions because they are isolated from the 
direct scrutiny of voters and changes in government (Gilardi, 2008). But IRAs also play 
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an integrative function as nodal points of wider regulatory networks that include national 
authorities, scientific communities, private enterprises and civil society organisations 
(Dehousse, 1997). It has been argued in the literature that the systematic inclusion of 
public and private stakeholders from multiple levels of government in formal and 
informal transnational networks facilitates the exchange of knowledge and the dynamic 
forging of consensus (Eberlein & Grande, 2005). In this sense, IRAs do not really stand 
“above politics”. Their integrative function is indicative of the incremental and negotiated 
nature of their decision processes. Their role in finding a point of equilibrium among 
various stakeholders in society suggests that their independence does not involve 
standing above the “social fray”. On the contrary, they are an intrinsic part of that “fray”. 
Because they maintain organized links with civil society, IRAs can invoke norms related 
to representation to reduce their lack of democratic legitimacy (Borras, Koutakalis & 
Wendler, 2007). They have, in EU parlance, some form of “input legitimacy”2. In this 
respect, their status is somewhat similar to independent advisory bodies such as Status of 
Women Canada or the National Seniors Council. These bodies operate at arm’s length 
from government and generally act as policy advocates, representing the voice of a 
particular sector of society in the governmental process (Malloy, 2003; Pal, 1993). 
Because they act as “lobbies from within”, these organizations cannot act as if they were 
purely “neutral” - as if they were not representing a particular societal interest. Their very 
existence is an admission that public policy-making in democratic societies is a process of 
political bargaining and “partisan mutual adjustment” among competing groups. Whenever 
they publicly defend a policy position, they are usually not invoking some technical or 
                                                
2 Conventionally, input-legitimacy is understood as the degree of inclusiveness and accountability of 
internal decision-making, while output-legitimacy is measured by the overall effectiveness of the system 
(Scharpf, 1997).  
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scientific principle or the allegedly neutral value of efficiency. They advocate policies on the 
basis of the more political principles of equality and fairness. And it is precisely because 
they are perceived as partisan advocates that they are often the targets of political attacks 
by governments or parties that do not share their ideological stances.  
 
Other independent bureaucracies, however, are more like recluse monks or hermits living 
insulated from society and politics. They are, in the words of Bowles and White writing 
about central banks, “the modern embodiment of the Platonic guardians, deemed to be 
above and beyond the normal political pressures and requirements of democratic 
societies” (1994, p. 236). This is particularly the case of “supreme audit institutions” 
(SAIs), the bodies that audit the accounts and expenditures of governments. These 
institutions are said to be “supreme” – like supreme courts – to underline their position as 
the highest authority in the audit of government accounts and the extent of their 
independence (Bowerman, Humphrey & Owen, 2003). Clarke suggests that SAIs have a 
form of “knowledge-based independence” where action involves the exercise of 
specialized knowledge disciplined by codes of conduct and where expertise is understood 
to be applied in a disinterested fashion (2005, p. 45).  
 
SAIs are national agencies responsible for auditing government revenue and spending. 
Their legal mandates, reporting relationships, and effectiveness vary, reflecting different 
governance systems and government policies. But their primary purpose is to oversee the 
management of public funds and the quality and credibility of governments’ reported 
financial data. Countries in North America and Europe use one of two auditing systems: 
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Napoleonic and Westminster. In the Napoleonic system the supreme audit institution - 
also called the cour des comptes - has both judicial and administrative authority and is 
independent of the legislative and executive branches. The institution is an integral part 
of the judiciary, rendering judgments on government compliance with laws and 
regulations as well as ensuring that public funds are well spent. The cour des comptes 
audits every government body, including ministries, departments, and agencies; 
commercial and industrial entities under the purview of ministries; and social security 
bodies. In the Westminster system (used in most Commonwealth countries), the office of 
the auditor general is an independent body that reports to parliament. Made up of 
professional auditors and technical experts, the office submits periodic reports on the 
financial statements and operations of government entities - but with less emphasis on 
legal compliance than in the Napoleonic system (Pollitt & Summa, 1999). 
 
SAIs have traditionally performed two types of audit: financial and compliance audits. In 
financial auditing the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of an organization’s 
financial statements. In compliance auditing the auditor checks whether government 
revenue and spending have been authorized and used for approved purposes. 
Transactions are reviewed to determine if government departments and agencies have 
conformed to all pertinent laws and regulations. This process includes checking the 
spending authority in the annual budget and any relevant legislation. But since at least the 
late 1970s, performance audit (or value-for-money audit) has taken state audit institutions 
far beyond their traditional concerns with financial probity and regularity.  
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In this article, the focus is on SAIs in the Westminster camp for two reasons. First, 
because within SAIs the move toward performance audit and questions of program 
efficiency and effectiveness has been much greater in the countries that are part of this 
category than in the Napoleonic model. As Pollitt and Summa found, “the language of 
managerialism - the discourse of justification by measured productivity and/or 
effectiveness - has penetrated some SAIs less than others” (1997, p. 332). These 
differences, they argue, are related to the different constitutional positions SAIs occupy in 
the political system (i.e. independent tribunals vs agents of parliament). Secondly, and 
more importantly for our argument, in branching into VFM audit, SAIs moved into the 
more subjective and more controversial territory of public policy analysis. In doing so, 
they took the risk of being seen as crossing the line between politics and administration 
(Humphrey, 2001). And as they ran the risk of becoming more embroiled in political 
territories, SAIs sought to more strongly “reassert their independence, neutrality, 
scientificity and pragmatism” (Humphrey, 2002, p. 56). It is precisely at this point that 
rationalist politics intervenes, for the synoptic model provided SAIs involved in 
performance auditing a mean of legitimizing their new found authority and demonstrating 
the credibility of their decision processes. It provided a way for SAIs to deploy what 
Humphrey calls in the British context “a scientific approach to politics” (2002). In 
Canada, S. L. Sutherland described the model of VFM audit institutionalised in the Office 
of the Auditor General in the late 1970s as being “characterised by an exaggerated faith 
in rationality…In this audit model there is a strong faith in the capacity and legitimacy of 
pure reason in administrative realms to sharply limit traditional political processes for 
making choices” (1986, p.141). 
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Performance Audit, Positivism and Evaluation 
With the development of performance audit, the overall balance of the work of SAIs 
shifted towards a more evaluative stance (Barzelay, 1997). Performance audit can range 
from examinations of economy and efficiency of the management of government 
programs through to determinations of whether goals have been achieved (effectiveness). 
Just as the purposes of audit have become more diverse, the audit entity, which is to say 
the organizational or logical parameters within which the scrutiny takes place, has also 
changed. For the broad-scope VFM studies, it has been shifted away from narrow, 
concrete audit entities such as budget categories and parliamentary votes, to much 
broader entities, often whole government programs and departments (Levy, 1996).  
 
These shifts toward performance audits has spurred debate about the differences and 
similarities between performance audit and program evaluation in terms of methodology, 
aim and scope, institutional setting, professional culture, contribution to improving 
governmental performance among other aspects (Chelimsky, 1985; Politt & Summa 
1996; Wisler 1996; Leeuw 1996).  Despite similarities, evaluation is a much less certain 
activity or ‘science’ than financial audit. As a social science discipline it is 
methodologically and epistemologically more divers and self-reflexive. Even evaluators 
working within a positivist paradigm, with experimental and quasi-experimental designs, 
since long acknowledge that the political context is an essential feature of program 
evaluation and can not be evacuated or disassociated from evaluation practice (Weiss, 
1998; Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman 2004). In extending their activities to performance audit, 
SAIs employed a wider range of analytical tools and moved into less solid and more 
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political territories. And with this move, the authority of SAIs began to be questioned 
(Power, 1997). As David Good underlined, “The performance audit, while appearing to 
ask simple, technical, and seemingly objective questions, actually focuses on the most 
political and subjective of all questions – How well is government doing?” (2007, p. 
218).  
 
While the development of performance auditing in the 1970s and 1980s brought auditing 
closer to evaluation, at the same time evaluation research and theorists began to raise 
more and more questions about the nature of social science and the authority of the 
knowledge derived from it (Nagel, 2001; Pawson & Tilly, 1997). The initial hopes that 
the results of scientific, experimental evaluation of programs would simply translate into 
better policy choices were rapidly disappointed. Instead, evaluators turned to more 
pragmatic approaches, taking into account the political and institutional realities of 
programs and turning to new forms of collaborating with stakeholders, through 
participatory approaches for example, but also through adapting research designs and 
methods to the messy reality of politics. Others went even further, and entirely rejected 
positivist notions underpinning much of evaluation practice (Guba & Lincoln 1989). 
Hence, as ideas about the applicability, authority, and scientific robustness of evaluations 
became more circumscribed, new approaches to evaluation increasingly insisted on the 
fact that evaluation practice is shaped by values (Majone, 1989) and proposed alternative 
ways for “judging” policies through collaboration, deliberation or even empowerment, 
hence conceiving alternative roles for evaluators, than being the neutral, independent 
assessor of facts.    
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But this was not how professional auditors and accountants working in SAIs saw their 
role in performance auditing. As Pollitt and Summa argued, “Performance auditors, 
notwithstanding their excursions beyond the comfortable world of verification, still wish 
to present their material as definitive, factual and value-neutral” (1996, p.47). The way 
SAIs institutionalized performance audit contradicted most post-positivist critiques of 
policy analysis. They assumed that audits would be summative, delivering authoritative 
judgements, based as far as possible on performance indicators or quantitative measures 
of input-output relationships and outcomes and set against predefined targets and 
standards. The epistemological stance was unequivocally positivist. It assumed that social 
phenomena could be divorced from their context and that objective knowledge about 
them could be achieved through empirical observation and quantitatively expressed; that 
facts were distinct from values and means from ends; that concepts and methods of ‘good 
management’ were applicable to the pursuit of any values (Henkel, 1991a).  
 
When politicians began to give SAIs the mandate to conduct VFM audit in the early 
1980s, there was no well-developed body of knowledge and techniques for performing 
such audits, either in government or in the large private accounting firms (McSweeney, 
1988, p.30). SAIs approached the development of performance audit from a financial 
accounting point of view, relying on quantitative methods and on the objectivity and 
neutrality accorded to numbers (Porter, 1995). As Miller noted, “The single figure 
provided by the calculative practices of accounting appears to be set apart from political 
interests and disputes, above the world of intrigue, and beyond debate” (2001, p.382). 
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Writing about the creation of the Audit Commission in Britain in the early 1980s, 
Michael Power argued that “the accountancy base of the Audit Commission undoubtedly 
gives it a legitimacy that other evaluation bodies lack” (1997, p.116). According to 
Henkel, this “played a significant part in the acquisition of authority on the part of the 
Audit Commission” (1991a, p. 224).  
 
The Legitimizing Function of the Synoptic Model  
The large gap between the synoptic model and the complex and often chaotic reality of 
public policy means that most government services and programs, when submitted to 
VFM audit, almost never meet the expectations of SAIs (Pollitt, 2003). A cursory glance 
at the observations and recommendations found in the performance audit reports 
published by SAIs indicates that the list of problems identified is almost always related to 
key synoptic assumptions, such as insufficient information, ambiguous goals, lack of 
coordination, absence of measurable indicators, poor strategic planning and inappropriate 
management control systems. In other words, the incrementalist nature of how 
government operates empirically, systematically fails to conform to the theoretical 
expectations of the synoptic model. The synoptic model suggests that there is a “one best 
way” but that politicians and bureaucrats are either unable, or worse, unwilling to follow 
it. This is why SAIs conducting VFM audit are sometimes accused of “negativity” 
(Corner & Drewry, 2005, p.76). By consistently criticizing government for failing to 
meet the expectations of the rational model, they put politicians and bureaucrats into a 
defensive mode that can stifle creativity, risk-taking and initiative (Roberts, 1996). Could 
SAIs avoid this outcome by auditing government policies not through the lenses of the 
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synoptic but of the incremental model? Could they audit programs and services using 
post-positivist theories and methods?  
 
That is not likely. In this final section, we suggest that SAIs do not mobilize the synoptic 
model because of its empirical robustness, but because of its symbolic properties in 
providing legitimacy for their expanded role in policy evaluation. Scholars have long 
wondered why certain institutional forms, or policy models and theories - even when 
their problem-solving capacities are in doubt - are nevertheless the object of mimetic 
practices by governments and found in many countries and jurisdictions across the globe 
(Meyer & Scott, 1983). This is the case, for instance, of central bank independence. 
While central bank independence has achieved an almost taken for granted quality in 
political life, the causal links between this particular organisational form and superior 
economic outcomes is said to be based on “shaky” empirical foundations (McNamara, 
2002, p. 59). Sociologists suggest that organizations adopt certain practices and methods 
not because they are always the most functionally efficient solution to a given problem, 
but because of their legitimising and symbolic properties (Radaelli, 2000). In these 
approaches, the choice of theories and organisational models are linked to social 
processes that legitimate certain types of choices as superior to others. In an influential 
article, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that organizations within a field often face 
“normative pressures” to enhance their legitimacy. Such pressures describe the effect of 
professional standards and the influence of professional communities on organizational 
characteristics. They capture the ways in which organizations are expected to conform to 
standards of professionalism and to adopt systems and techniques considered to be 
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legitimate by relevant professional groupings. These norms are conveyed through 
education and training and professional networks.  
 
In the SAIs field, the sources of social interactions and linkages between actors are 
numerous, found in the accounting bodies at the national level and in various 
international organizations such as the International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI), the European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(EUROSAI) and the International Center for Performance Auditing. The development of 
such “epistemic communities” facilitates the forging of expert consensus (Haas, 1992). 
The shared educational background of those circulating among these different networks 
is also a foundational aspect of socialization processes that produces conformity in 
outlook and common styles of thinking (Saint-Martin, 2004). 
 
In an article on the training of accountants, Hines talks about the “dominant positivist 
worldview” in the account profession, where it “is assumed that economic reality exists 
independently of accounting practices and that the major role of accounting is to 
communicate that reality” (1989, p. 53). As Pollitt and Summa found in their interviews 
and analysis of the reports published by five SAIs, many auditors see performance 
auditing as a “science” and see their work as founded on the “positivist myth that there is 
only one true story to be told” (1996, p. 44). They see their role as producing information 
that is “authoritative, unbiased, above mere political argument, objective, conclusive” 
(Pollitt & Summa, 1996, p. 44). But as discussed earlier, the shift from old-fashioned 
financial audit to performance auditing has made such expectations increasingly difficult 
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to meet. The traditional audit criteria of procedural correctness have been supplemented 
by more complex and slippery criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(Radford, 1991). Whereas in traditional financial auditing, accounts are certified as 
constituting a “true and fair account”, it is more difficult to make a comparable 
epistemological claim with regard to performance auditing.  
 
VFM audit, because of its similarities with policy analysis and evaluation, also challenges 
the independence of SAIs. One of the goals of performance auditing is to help 
government improve the “three Es” of its management practices. But when SAIs begin to 
make usefulness to audited bodies a major criterion of their work this can conflict with 
their original mission of fearlessly reporting waste, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in 
public administration. If SAIs start to play the “quasi-consultancy role of helping audited 
bodies to improve their performances then it would be easy for cosy, less-than 
independent relationships to develop” (Pollitt & Summa, 1997, p. 324).  
 
The independence of SAIs is based on two things: the law that created them and their 
knowledge base. Auditors are part of an authoritative system of controls in the set of 
public bodies that constitute a democratic government, and their work is based on 
statutory powers and a mandate which more or les defines the limits of their territory. The 
law requires them to approach their work form the perspective of guardianship and 
control, with a basic role of holding public bodies to account for the expenditures of 
public funds. Regarding their knowledge base, traditional financial auditing, with its 
focus on numbers, used to strengthen SAIs’ sense of independence (Vollmer, 2003). It 
 20 
provided methods and concepts that allow state auditors to produce information that was 
seen as objective and credible. But the arrival of VFM audit generated uncertainties by 
making that “positivist myth” more difficult to sustain. The synoptic model provided 
symbolic reassurance that the values of independence and objectivity were untouched by 
the auditors’ new role in policy evaluation. It provided a “rational fiction” (McNamara, 
2002) for securing legitimacy in public life.  
 
Conclusion 
In 1959, Lindblom showed that theories describing decision-making as a rational, 
apolitical and technical process were based on contestable arguments and inconclusive 
empirical evidence. But 50 years later such rationalist theories still form the primary 
theoretical lenses through which independent bureaucracies like SAIs analyse the 
performance of government entities. To understand why such organizations embrace the 
synoptic model despite its empirical weaknesses, this article has focused on its symbolic 
functions in legitimating the role of SAIs in performance auditing and in conveying 
credibility to external audiences in the broader political and social environment.   
 
Our analysis reveals that while independent bureaucracies might be more likely to adopt 
rationalist politics as a strategy for legitimising their activities, it is the combination of 
several factors that explains why SAI’s are particularly prone to embrace the synoptic 
model. In contrast to other independent bureaucracies, the SAI is not part of a larger 
network of societal stakeholders that it coordinates and from whose input it derives 
legitimacy. Institutionally speaking SAIs are conceived to be “above politics”. 
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Furthermore, while evaluation practice is multidisciplinary and there is no “profession” in 
the strict sense, auditing constitutes a profession with clear rules and standards of 
practice. As such auditing is characterized by a culture emphasising specific values, 
namely the fact-value dichotomy and the objectivation of social reality through 
quantitative methods.  And finally, the rise of new public management created new 
opportunities for SAI’s to expand their realm of influence.   
 
But, one might argue, is not all politics prone to sell its policy choices as the result of 
rational analysis? While governments tend to sell their policies as the “right” choice 
taking into account the current state of knowledge, this does not constitute their primary 
source of legitimacy. They have been elected because of the values they represent, and 
this allows them to more openly acknowledge the value-laden character of their choices. 
 
As our analysis demonstrates, Lindblom’s work on incrementalism as mode of analysis 
and politics remains a valuable tool for thinking about today’s issues in public policy and 
public administration. Other contributions in this special issue argue that some of his 
assumptions might not hold up anymore or have been absorbed or eclipsed by other, 
newer theories. Nevertheless, key ideas underpinning incrementalism, namely that there 
is no fact-value dichotomy and that policy-making does not consist of matching means to 
ends, have been reinforced by theoretical developments since the 1980s (argumentative 
turn in policy analysis, new institutionalism, theories on problem definition and agenda 
setting) and still constitute valuable insights for policy analysis. More than half a century 
after Lindblom’s seminal article was published, this is sure enough of a reason to 
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celebrate the impact his ideas had on the development of public policy and public 
administration as a discipline. 
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